Three chimpanzees performed a computerized memory task in which auditory feedback about the accuracy of each response was delayed. The delivery of food rewards for correct responses also was delayed and occurred in a separate location from the response. Crucially, if the chimpanzees did not move to the reward-delivery site before food was dispensed, the reward was lost and could not be recovered. Chimpanzees were significantly more likely to move to the dispenser on trials they had completed correctly than on those they had completed incorrectly, and these movements occurred before any external feedback about the outcome of their responses. Thus, chimpanzees moved (or not) on the basis of their confidence in their responses, and these confidence movements aligned closely with objective task performance. These untrained, spontaneous confidence judgments demonstrated that chimpanzees monitored their own states of knowing and not knowing and adjusted their behavior accordingly.
Introduction
Humans provide confidence judgments about their own actions, knowledge, and abilities. They do this in many circumstances (e.g., studying, test taking, game-show participation), and those judgments are often assumed to reflect humans' metacognition (Benjamin, Bjork, & Schwartz, 1998; Dunlosky & Bjork, 2008; Flavell, 1979; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1994; Kornell, 2009; Nelson, 1992; Schwartz, 2008) . Metacognition is considered to be a sophisticated cognitive capacity and perhaps even uniquely human (Metcalfe & Kober, 2005) . It emerges later in human development than many other cognitive capacities (Balcomb & Gerken, 2008) . It is often expressed through verbal reports, though it can be expressed behaviorally in other ways (e.g., a shrug of the shoulders). It is of intense interest to many researchers working to understand how humans comprehend, learn, and remember (e.g., Bjork, Dunlosky, & Kornell, 2012; Koriat & Goldsmith, 1996; Kornell & Son, 2009; Nelson & Dunlosky, 1991; Reder, 1987) . The question of whether nonhuman animals might show degrees of metacognition is also intensely debated based on empirical reports of uncertainty-monitoring tasks, information-seeking tasks, and other tasks given to animals which often show strongly isomorphic performances in animals and humans (Carruthers, 2008 (Carruthers, , 2009 Crystal, 2014; Crystal & Foote, 2009; Hampton, 2009; Jozefowiez, Staddon, & Cerutti, 2009; Kornell, 2009 Kornell, , 2014 Le Pelley, 2012; Smith, 2009; Smith, Beran, Couchman, & Coutinho, 2008) . It is an important question as to whether animals share any of the features of humans' metacognition because evidence for or against such capacities in animals could inform us about the nature of their consciousness and self-awareness. This could affect many theoretical debates within comparative psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science. However, this does not mean that claims for evidence of metacognition in animals require acceptance of the idea of self-aware consciousness across species that show such metacognition. It simply means that studies of animal metacognition can help advance the pursuit of a better understanding of whether animals might show some similarities with humans in terms of conscious experiences.
Metacognition, as we use the term, refers to executivelycontrolled decision making in which behavior arises independently of external stimulus control. Metacognition is different from forms of learning (ranging from associative learning to observational http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cognition.2015.05.023 0010-0277/Ó 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
